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Sammendrag 
Vi kan estimere den faktiske verdien av en naturressurs slik som fisk, skog og mineraler ved å bruke 
nasjonalregnskapet. Da benytter vi gjeldende kostnader, priser og tall for fangst/høstning/utvinning. 
Ressursrenten tilsvarer det som er igjen etter at alle kostnader er trukket fra fortjenesten, også 
kostnader ved å ha investert i fast kapital.  Verdien av ressursrenten som fremkommer er gitt dagens 
forvaltningsregime og vil blant annet avhenge av markedsstruktur, teknologi og politiske føringer. 
Økonomisk teori tilsier at denne skulle være positiv dersom forvaltingen hadde optimal verdiskaping 
som målsetting.  
 
I dette arbeidet studerer vi ressursrenten i norske fiskerier. Ved å bruke tall fra nasjonalregnskapet 
finner vi at den faktiske ressursrenten i norske fiskerier var negativ i perioden fra 1984 til 2014 med 
unntak av 2010-2011. Samtidig finner vi at ressursrenten gradvis har økt i samme periode. Ved å 
dekomponere den faktiske ressursrenten for denne perioden finner vi at økningen i all hovedsak 
skyldes reduserte kostnader som følge av færre fiskere og færre fartøy.  
 
For å få et anslag på hva verdiskapningen i sektoren kunne ha vært, beregner vi den optimale 
ressursrenten for norske fiskerier ved hjelp av en numerisk modell. For 2011 finner vi at den 
optimale ressursrenten er 9,3 milliarder NOK. Dette er om lag 7 milliarder mer enn den 
faktiske renten samme år enten vi måler den utfra tall fra nasjonalregnskapet eller ut fra 
Fiskeridirektoratets lønnsomhetsanalyser. Forskjellen på 7 milliarder er et mål på kostnadene 
ved dagens forvaltningsregime. Fordi ressursrenten kan økes med lavere antall fiskere og 
færre fartøy i sektoren, er vi per definisjon i en situasjon med ressurssløsing gitt at både 
humankapitalen og realkapitalen har en alternativ verdi i andre sektorer. Ved å gjøre en enkel 
justering av forskjellen mellom optimale og faktiske inntekter og kostnader lik det vi fant for 
2011, viser resultatene at den optimale ressursrenten for 2010 og 2012 henholdsvis ligger 6,9 
og 7,4 milliarder NOK over den faktiske renten. Selv om dette er en veldig enkel tilnærming 
er ikke beløpene langt fra de 7 milliardene vi fant var kostnadene ved å opprettholde 
forvaltningsregimet i 2011. 
 
Vi utfører en rekke følsomhetsberegninger og finner at den optimale ressursrenten i 2011 er 
relativ stabil under ulike forutsetninger. Siden vi ikke har data for de mest effektive fartøyene 
i en fartøygruppe, kan vi ikke simulere en situasjon der alle fartøyene i en gruppe er like den 
mest effektive. Således får vi en lavere optimal ressursrente enn man kunne fått i en situasjon 
der fiskerne tok i bruk den mest effektive teknologien. 
 
Vi har ikke funnet tall for hvor mye tid et spesielt fartøy i en fartøygruppe bruker på å fange et 
spesielt fiskeslag. Dette kan påvirke de variable kostnadene for ulike fartøygrupper og først 
og fremst gjøre våre resultater om optimal fordeling av fangsten på de ulike gruppene mer 
usikker. 
 
Til slutt vil vi også understreke at noen fartøygrupper opp igjennom årene har hatt større mu-
lighet til å effektivisere innenfor det til enhver tid gjeldende regelverket enn andre. Disse far-
tøygruppene vil dermed komme ut med relativt lavere kostnader enn de som har hatt mindre 
mulighet til å velge teknologi og kapasitet. 
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1. Introduction  
The UN Report "Our common future" (1987) defines "sustainable development" as "development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs". Several sets of indicators have been proposed in order to uncover unsustainable economic 
development. One approach is the so-called capital approach to sustainable development, which is 
based on calculating national wealth; see e.g. Alfsen and Greaker (2007).  The rationale is that 
"consumption" must be "produced" every year from the use of certain capital stocks e.g. manmade 
capital, human capital and natural resource capital. In order to uncover unsustainable practices we 
need to periodically monitor the state of the capital stocks.  Assuming that capital stocks can substitute 
for each other, a rather strong assumption, sustainable development only requires that the value of the 
capital stocks together, that is national wealth, is kept constant (or is growing).  
 
Statistics Norway has been involved in calculating Norwegian national wealth for several years based 
on data from the System of National Accounts (SNA). Statistics Norway (2014) shows that national 
wealth per capita has been on an increasing trend throughout the period 1984 to 20131, which is an 
indication of sustainability. National wealth only includes the inputs used to produce net national 
income (NNI) as measured and defined in the SNA. These comprise human capital stocks, physical 
capital stocks, financial assets and natural resource stocks. The net income from a resource is coined 
resource rent. The resource rent is the additional income a nation/region/user obtains from having the 
exclusive right to exploit a natural resource. The resources included in the Norwegian SNA are the 
renewable natural resource sectors; agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, fisheries and hydropower, and 
the nonrenewable natural resources; oil, gas and minerals.  While both the value of physical capital 
and foreign financial holdings is given directly in the SNA, the values of the natural resource stocks 
must be computed. The contribution of each resource stock to national wealth is given as the present 
value of the future stream of resource rents.  
 
Despite everyone’s perception of Norway being very rich in natural resources, the calculations show 
that apart from oil and gas, natural resources only make up a tiny part of Norwegian national wealth. 
For instance, in the calculations for 2013, Statistics Norway (2014) found that human capital 
comprised 72 percent of national wealth, while oil and gas and physical capital comprised 
approximately 9 and 13 percent, respectively. Financial wealth was around 6 percent of national 
                                                     
1 There were temporary setbacks in wealth per capita in 1989, 2003, 2008 and 2009. 
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wealth, while the contribution of the renewable natural resources taken together was less than one 
percent, and the positive estimate was to a large extent due to the value of hydropower.  
This paper performs an investigation of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries.  First we show the 
development of the components of resource rent over time from 1984 to 2014 based on SNA in order 
to explain why the actual resource rent has been low. The resource rent was negative in all years 
except 2010 and 2011. However, the actual resource rent has gradually increased since 1984. 
Compensation to employees is the largest cost component affecting the rent of Norwegian fisheries, 
and this cost is much larger than the return on fixed capital and capital consumption.  Total revenues 
in the sector have remained fairly constant, and the increase in resource rent is mainly due to lower 
total costs of labor and capital. Thus, the actual resource rent has increased mainly due to 
consolidation indicating that more of the fisheries income is distributed on fewer vessels and fishers. 
 
In order to estimate the optimal value of the Norwegian natural resources, this paper continues by 
calculating a contra factual value of the resources given an optimal management practice. This has 
previously been calculated for Norwegian fisheries (see for example Hanneson, 1996; Steinshamn 
2005), but the last time was several years ago. We define optimal as the maximum resource rent in 
2011 applying catch quotas, prices, costs and technology in 2011 in Directorate of Fisheries (2012). 
Using a numerical optimization model we estimate the contra factual value of the Norwegian fisheries 
and find that the resource rent in 2011 could have been 7 billion NOK higher than the actual rent. If 
the resource rent in the fishery sector can be increased by e.g. fewer fishers and vessels than with the 
present management, we have per definition a situation with resource waste in the fishery sector as 
well as less value creation elsewhere as both human and fixed capital have an alternative value in 
other sectors (see definition of resource rent in Section 3). Hence, 7 billion NOK is the cost only in the 
fishery sector in 2011 of having the present management system. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Norwegian policy regime. Section 3 gives 
an overview of how the resource rent is calculated using the SNA and Section 4 presents the actual 
resource rent in the fisheries over the last three decades. In Section 5 we take a closer look at the 
actual and optimal resource rent in 2011 and in Section 6 we describe the data. Section 7 shows the 
optimization results and in Section 8 we perform various sensitivity analyses. Section 9 is a discussion 
of the results and Section 10 concludes. 
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2. The Norwegian Policy Regime 
The Marine Resources Act of June 6, 2008 no. 37 states that “the wild living marine resources belong 
to the Norwegian society as a whole”.  The Act requires that resource management uses a 
precautionary approach, an ecosystem approach, and that there is a safe use of gear.  The Act also 
mandates that resources should be allocated to help ensure employment and settlement in coastal 
communities and that there should be an optimal utilization of resources that is adapted to marine 
value creation, markets and industries. 
 
In 2011 Norwegian fisheries had 10220 full-time fishers, 2548 part-time fishers and 6250 vessels 
(Directorate of Fisheries, 2015). Together, they landed approximately around 2 million tons of fish 
(excl. crustaceans, shells, seaweed and sea tangle). These numbers can be compared to the situation in 
1984 – the first year of our resource rent calculations. In 1984 Norwegian fisheries had 22861 full-
time fishers, 6767 part-time fishers and 24078 vessels. However, their landings in tons were 
approximately the same as in 2011. The downward trend in the number of fishermen and vessels is 
partly due to official Norwegian policy. The Norwegian fishery management underwent a large 
transformation during the last part of the 19 century. Spurred by the collapse in the Atlanto-Scandian 
herring stock in the late 1960s the Norwegian Government started to restrict entry into more and more 
fisheries. At the same time they introduced measures such as scrapping subsidies in order to reduce the 
overcapacity in the fleet. The excess capacity was a result of technological progress, for instance the 
introduction of fish finding equipment and mechanical purse seines (Hanneson, 2005).  
 
The fishery management regime in Norway is complex. For as much as about 90 percent of fisheries, 
Norway’s annual total allowable catch (TAC) is determined in bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
with other nations. For the remaining part of the fisheries national authorities set TACs independently 
based on expert advice. For each stock, the overall TACs are allocated by the Norwegian government 
and politicians to different vessel groups, and further distributed within the vessel group among the 
vessels holding the necessary licenses to participate. All fishing vessels need to have a commercial 
license, and only Norwegian citizens and active fishers (participated at least three of the last five 
years) may apply for a commercial license. The rationale for this regulation is to ensure that the 
returns on the fisheries activities go to the active fishers in the coastal communities.  
 
There is a distinction between vessel groups that belong to the costal fleet and those that belong to the 
ocean-going fleet when allocating TACs. Vessels in the costal fleet receive an annual permit based on 
the TAC, which is not tradable in any way. The boats in the ocean-going fleet have individual vessel 
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quotas, which may last for several years, and which to some extent is tradable. The individual vessel 
quotas only imply a right to fish a certain proportion of the overall TAC allocated to the ocean-going 
vessels. Moreover, the authorities can withdraw permits and licenses if conditions are not met, and can 
also allocate new licenses and permits. Licenses and annual permits are not tradable across fleets and 
vessel categories, as they are issued to and associated with a given vessel type. However, when vessels 
are traded within a vessel type, the license and annual permit follow the vessel when permission has 
been granted - with certain restrictions - by the authorities.  
 
In order to reduce overcapacity in the fishing fleet, a system for quota consolidation in the fishing fleet 
called the Structural Quota System was introduced in 2004 (The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries, 2007).  The main principle of the Structural Quota System is that a vessel 
owner can buy another vessel and transfer the other vessel’s quota (a structural quota) to his/her own 
vessel. The vessel that hands over the structural quota must then be scrapped. In this way the system 
facilitates increased vessel profitability. However, other considerations are also taken into account, 
including regional policies. A geographically dispersed fishing fleet must be maintained in order to 
support coastal communities and their cultural heritage. Some restrictions are therefore implemented, 
including maximum quota per vessel, geographically limited markets, transactions only within vessel 
groups and mandatory scrapping. A major shift took place during the period 2004 to 2006 when some 
trade across vessel types became permitted. In particular, this reduced the fleet of the trawlers, a type 
of ocean-going vessel. According to the Norwegian fishery authorities, the Structural Quota System 
resulted in the following degree of traded quotas in selected vessel groups:  
Table 1. Structural quotas in different vessel groups during the last few years2 
Vessel group Percentage traded structural quotas
Purse seiners herring 18.6 per cent
Pelagic trawlers 54.7 per cent
Coastal vessels herring 39.6 per cent 
Cod trawlers  57.0 per cent
Ocean-going line fishing vessels for cod 57.1 per cent
Coastal vessels cod 22.2 per cent
We see that the amount of trading is larger among the trawlers and ocean-going line fishing vessels. 
As far as we can understand, only the ocean-going part of the fishing fleet has undergone large 
structural changes. The coastal fishing fleet still receives a large share of the TAC for many fish 
stocks, and the incentives for reducing the number of boats are much weaker within this segment.  
                                                     
2 Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (2015). 
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3. Calculation of the Actual Resource Rent of Fisheries using Na-
tional Accounts 
The calculation method of resource rent in Norwegian natural resource sectors is presented in Table 2. 
Statistics Norway’s calculation of the resource rent (see e.g. Greaker, Løkkevik and Aasgaard Walle, 
2005) in marine fisheries is comprehensive in that it includes full and part-time fishers, and the net 
revenue from the capture of all wild marine organisms3, by both commercial and non-commercial 
vessels.  Statistics Norway calculates a factor, which is used to scale-up the basic value from the 
commercial vessels participating in the profitability analysis in Directorate of Fisheries (2012) to 
encompass the whole vessel fleet. We simply downscale this basic value with the same factor to get 
comparable numbers between national accounts and the Directorate of Fisheries (2012).  
Table 2. Calculation of the actual resource rent 
Sign Term 
+ Basic value of production 
- Intermediate uses 
+ Taxes on products 
- Subsidies on products 
= Gross product 
- Non-Industry specific taxes 
+ Non-Industry specific subsidies 
- Compensation of employees 
- Return on fixed capital 
- Capital consumption 
= Resource rent of the sector 
 
The basic value of production is equivalent to total revenues. The intermediate uses are goods and 
services consumed or used up as inputs in production. There were no product specific taxes or 
subsidies in the time period considered in this paper.  While there has been and still is in place a fuel 
tax exemption for fishing vessels, this subsidy is not product specific and is therefore not included in 
the resource rent calculations. 
 
When calculating compensation of employees and return to fixed capital, it is a goal to use wage rates 
and rates of return that reflect the alternative value of both the fishers and the capital employed in the 
sector. Statistics Norway calculates the compensation of employees as the number of hours worked 
times the average mainland wage rate for the non-natural resource industries, and the return on fixed 
capital is four per cent of the value of the stock of fixed capital. It is necessary to include income for 
                                                     
3 Including crustaceans, shells and seaweed. Aquaculture is not included. 
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the vessel owners, as their income is not part of the wages in the profitability survey, but part of the 
operating profit. 
 
Care must be taken when deciding which subsidies and taxes to include in the calculation of the 
resource rent and how to include them.  Taxes on products, can be regarded as a part of the value that 
is created by the industry when the resource is extracted, while a product specific subsidy can be seen 
as part of the costs of extracting the resource.  A product specific tax paid by the specific resource 
industry must therefore be added to the resource rent, while a product specific subsidy must be 
subtracted.  There are no product specific taxes or subsidies in Norwegian fisheries.  According to 
Eurostat (2001) industry specific taxes and subsidies shall not be included in the calculation of the 
resource rent because they are simply a transfer of the resource rent between the Government and the 
industry and do not affect the bottom line value of the resource rent.  However, industry specific taxes 
and subsidies may affect the structure of the industry. For instance, lowered financing costs to fishers 
taking up loans to purchase a fishing vessel will over time result in overcapitalization and “too many 
boats chasing too few fish” and thus contribute to reduced resource rents. Currently, Norwegian 
fishers are exempt from fuel taxes, which contribute to inefficient use of fossil fuels in the industry 
and increased CO2 emissions. The cost, not including the tax administration costs, to the Norwegian 
Government of the fuel-tax exemption was estimated to NOK 999 million in 2011 (Isaksen, 
Hermansen and Flaaten, 2015). According to Eurostat (2001) non-industry specific taxes shall be 
subtracted and non-industry specific subsidies shall be added because these transfers, being 
independent of industry, can be considered standard costs/income from doing business. An example of 
non-industry specific tax is firms’ social security contributions. However, as industry specific taxes 
and subsidies may affect the resource rent, in addition to that the fact that the distinction between what 
is industry specific and what is not is sometimes vague, we chose to leave all taxes and subsidies out 
of our calculations. Total taxes and subsidies are generally between 3 and 7 per cent of the gross 
product as from 1995 and will often more or less cancel each other out. The net effect will 
nevertheless be small and will only affect our results in a minor way. 
4. The Actual Resource Rent in Norwegian Fisheries over the Last 
Decades 
Figure 1 shows the components of the resource rents in Norway for the period 1984 – 2014 as 
calculated using national account numbers. Gross product is total revenue less the value of 
intermediate uses as explained above. The actual resource rent is negative for all years except for 2010 
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and 20114. The reason for the negative rent is primarily the high level of compensation of employees 
compared to the gross product. The resource rent is generally on an increasing trend from the late 
1980s, although there are yearly variations due to changes in the gross product (i.e. price and/or catch). 
The increase in actual rent is above all due to lower compensation of employees and to some extent 
reduced capital consumption and return on fixed capital.  
Figure 1. The components of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries 1984-2014 
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Figure 2 shows that capital consumption and return on fixed capital has declined in line with a lower 
number of vessels, although the gross tonnage5 is more or less the same. 
  
                                                     
4 The resource rent according to Statistics Norway and the national accounts was 2.153 billion NOK in 2011. However, 
applying the numbers in Directorate of Fisheries (2012) the rent is around 2.050 billion NOK. Part of the reason is different 
ways of calculating fixed capital and the number of man-years. 
5 Gross tonnage is a measure of the “total volume of all enclosed spaces of the ship”. The measure for Gross tonnage is 
defined by The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships and was adopted by the International Maritime 
Organization in 1969. We were not able to find older Gross Tonnage numbers for Norwegian vessels than 1997. 
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Figure 2. The number of vessels 1984-2013 and gross tonnage 1997-2012 in Norwegian fisheries 
 
 
Even if the number of man-years for the full-time and part-time fishers has declined by around 60 and 
72 per cent since 1984, respectively, as shown in see Figure 3, total compensation of employees is 
only 30 per cent lower in 2014 compared to the early 1980s due to increases in real wages. 
Figure 3. The number of man-years in Norwegian fisheries 1984-2014 
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5. A Closer Look at the Actual and Optimal Resource Rent in 2011 
The resource rent obtained depends on the management regime including (1) the total allowable catch 
(TAC) and (2) the technology used to harvest the TAC, that is the types and numbers of vessels. In 
pure open access regimes, fish stocks become overharvested and may become extinct (Clark, 
1990).  Setting and enforcing catch quotas is one way to secure viable fish populations.  Ideally, the 
catch quota, i.e. the TAC, should be low enough so that fish stocks are capable to regenerate between 
harvests and therefore can be harvested in perpetuity. This TAC level is typically denoted the Maxium 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) (Clark, 1990).  MSY is purely based on biological parameters. The optimal 
harvest level that also takes economic parameters into account is called the bioeconomically optimal 
harvest level. We do not attempt to estimate the bioeconomically optimal harvest level in this paper 
but assume that the TACs in 2011 were set to the fish stocks’ MSY-levels. 
 
For a given TAC the number of vessels may be too large or the vessels used may be too inefficient to 
maximize the resource rent. In addition, the allocation of the TAC geographically and among vessels 
types may lead to further loss of resource rent. 
 
As shown in Figure 1 and Table 3, Statistics Norway estimate the actual resource rent in Norwegian 
capture fisheries to 2011-NOK 2.153 billion. If we instead calculate the resource rent applying data 
from the profitability survey by the Directorate of Fisheries, the actual resource rent was 2011-NOK 
2.050 billion. The reason for the divergence in resource rent estimates is different ways of calculating 
fixed capital and the number of man-years applying the national accounts compared to the accounts in 
the profitability survey. 
Table 3. Estimates of the actual resource rent. 
Resource rent -estimate Resource rent (billion NOK) 
SNA: Professional full-time fishers that earn a certain 
minimum annually 
 
2.153 billion NOK 
Profitability Survey: Professional full-time fishers that earn a 
certain minimum annually 
 
2.050 billion NOK 
Profitability Survey: Ten most valuable fish species 1.453 billion NOK 
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To be included in the 2011 profitability survey vessels had to earn a certain level of income from their 
fishing operation6. If limiting ourselves to the ten7,8 economically most important species the actual 
resource rent was 2011-NOK 1.453 billion. 
 
Given today’s TACs, number and types of vessels, and labor force we now move on to find an 
estimate of the optimal resource rent if the catch could be redistributed among vessels according to the 
groups that receive the best price for the catch, have the lowest cost and where vessels operate at their 
maximum biologically and technically possible season length. To do this we use a linear programming 
model based on Steinshamn (2005). The model maximizes net revenues, that is maximizes resource 
rent, given the total allowable catch for each fish species i, iTAC , which we assume is set to a 
sustainable level and the fixed catch capacity per vessel in vessel group j given by technology, jKAP , 
by choosing the optimal number of vessels in each vessel group jN  and the total catch of fish species 
i for vessel group  j, ,i jY . The model is specified as: 
 
(1) 
,
, , ,
,Y 0 1 1 1
( )max
j i j
N M M
i j i j j i j j j
N i j j
RR p f VC Y N FC
   
      
Subject to: 
(2)   ,i j i
j
Y TAC    1, ...,i N   
(3)   ,i j j j
i
Y KAP N  1,...,j M   
(4)   0jN   , , 0i jY    
 
Here ,i jp  is the price received, jVC  is the variable cost, ,i jf  is the time/effort coefficient, and jFC  
is the fixed cost. Notice that the price depends both on species and vessel group, in other words, all 
vessels do not receive the same price for the same fish.  The model also includes by-catch 
relationships and seasonal catch-limits (Steinshamn, 2005), which we discuss in further the data 
section. Politically determined constraints, such as the distribution of catch between coastal and ocean-
                                                     
6 To be included in the activity survey, earnings must be at least NOK 471,000 for vessels 0-9.9m, NOK 784,000 for vessels 
10-10.9m, NOK 1,177,000 for vessels 11-14.9m and NOK 2,353,000 for vessels 15m and above. 
7 These species are cod, herring, haddock, saithe, mackerel, cusk, ling, blue whiting, capelin and shrimp. In Norwegian: torsk, 
sild, hyse, sei, makrell, brosme, lange, kolmule, lodde og reke. 
8 We focus on these ten species because they on average contributed to 90 per cent of the basic value in the years 2006-2013. 
2006: 89 per cent, 2007: 91 per cent, 2008: 91 per cent, 2009: 89 per cent, 2010: 89 per cent, 2011: 91 per cent, 2012: 91 per 
cent and 2013: 90 per cent (Directorate of Fisheries, 2015). 
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going vessels are omitted from this model but are added in the sensitivity analysis.  The model in 
equations (1)-(4) is calibrated for the ten economically most important species with 2011 data for 
prices, costs, quotas and vessel groups.  
6. Data 
In parameterizing our model we consider the thirteen vessels groups (see Table 4) that were included 
in the 2011 profitability survey of the fisheries (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012). 
Table 4. Vessel groups and number of fishers employed in each vessel group. 
Vessel 
group 
number 
Vessel description Geographic regions of 
operation in Norway 
 No. 
vessels 
No. 
employed 
1 Coastal vessels using conventional 
gear. Vessels below 11 meters quota 
length 
Mainly in the north, 
some south. 
 
 611 1039 
2 Coastal vessels using conventional 
gear. Vessels 11-14.9 meters quota 
length 
Mainly in the north, 
some south. 
 
 293 791 
3 Coastal vessels using conventional 
gear. Vessels 15-20.9 meters quota 
length 
Mainly in the north, 
some south 
 
 121 799 
4 Coastal vessels using conventional 
gear. Vessels 21 meters quota length 
and above 
All  
 
 37 392 
5 Ocean-going vessels using 
conventional gear 
All 
 
 35 1061 
6 Trawlers. Vessels with cod trawling 
and/or shrimp trawling license 
All 
 
 39 1556 
7 Coastal shrimp trawlers All 
 
 80 224 
8 Other trawlers (fishing for saithe, 
lesser and greater argentines and 
more) 
All 
 
 4 82 
9 Coastal vessels using seine. Vessels 
below 11 meters quota length 
All 
 
 43 77 
10 Coastal vessels using seine. Vessels 
11-21.35 meters quota length 
All 
 
 93 409 
11 Coastal vessels using seine. Vessels 
21.36 meters quota length and above 
All 
 
 62 552 
12 Purse seines All 
 
 80 1192 
13 Pelagic trawlers South of Norway  27 215 
    1525 8389 
 
These vessel groups harvested a total of 2 million metric tons in 2011 when the first-hand value was 
estimated to NOK 14.6 billion. This corresponds to about 91 percent of the total first-hand value in 
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Norwegian fisheries in 20119. For TAC we use the actual total Norwegian catch in 2011 for the ten 
economically most important species. The TAC for these ten species was 1.83 million tons in 2011 
(see table A1 in Appendix A), and constitute 71 percent of the actual total resource rent when we 
apply total catches in the profitability survey (see Table 3).  
 
Fish prices, pi,j, for each vessel group and species, which are provided in Table A2 were also found in 
the 2011 profitability survey (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012). We measure the present capacity, KAPj, 
of a single vessel in each vessel group as follows: Actual catch is first divided by number of days in 
operation listed in the profitability survey. This capacity is secondly multiplied with the potential 
number of days in operation (see Table A3). This potential capacity is further downscaled due to 
biological and/or technical reasons when calculating the adjusted potential variable costs for the 
various species/vessel groups (see below). We apply the average catch of a vessel as we have no data 
for the most efficient vessels in each group. Hence, our optimal resource rent is lower than it would 
have been if we were a situation where all fishers adopted the most efficient technology. 
 
Actual variable costs, VCj, for each vessel group is defined as operating expenses less depreciation on 
vessel and less depreciation on fishing licenses and permits and less insurance on vessel (all of it as 
reported in the profitability survey). This value is divided by total catch to get average variable costs 
per kg for each vessel group (see Table A4 and A5) as we have no data on the distribution of costs 
within each vessel group. Hence, our optimal rent is lower than the one you would get if all vessels 
were replaced by the vessels with lowest variable costs. 
 
The variable cost may be adjusted by a time/catch relation fi,j to take into account that the time used to 
catch fish of a certain species varies among species and vessel types. The fij-values applied in 
Steinshamn (2005) were based on estimates from the 1996 and 1994 Survey of Activities10.  
Steinshamn’s (2005) numbers cannot be applied directly in our study because the Directorate of 
Fisheries later formed new and consolidated vessel categories. While Steinshamn (2005) operates with 
25 vessel groups, we have as mentioned now 13 groups (see Table 4). Furthermore, the only existing f-
values are based on 17-18 year old data when stocks and technologies were different.  Thus for lack of 
better knowledge, we chose to set all fi,j =1 if vessel group j catches species i, and otherwise, fi,j = 10, a 
                                                     
9 The reason is that the vessels included in the population have an income above a specific minimum level. This means that 
the number of vessels in the profitability survey are 1525, even if the Register of Norwegian Fishing vessels registers a total 
of 6250 in 2011 of which 5417 are active. Total catch in tons in the profitability survey is around 90 per cent of total 
Norwegian catch. 
10 In Norwegian: “Aktivitetsundersøkelsen i 1996”. 
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large enough upscaling of the variable cost to prevent the vessel group from harvesting the particular 
species. It is possible that some vessel groups have fij-values lower/higher  than one, in that case they 
might do more/less of the harvesting. 
 
To estimate fixed costs FCj we use data for total fixed assets for each vessel group from Directorate of 
Fisheries (2012). We deduct the book value of fishing licenses and permits from this value to get the 
value of fixed capital, and we add insurance on vessel (see Table A5). 
 
We include by-catch constraints that show the relationship of haddock caught per unit cod (see Table 
A6). We also include restrictions on the length of the season due to weather conditions; climate, 
resource availability etc. (see Table A7). These are included in the model through an upward 
adjustment of the variable costs to get adjusted potential variable costs (see Table A8). Further, we 
introduce restrictions on the shrimp fisheries because it is unreasonable that coastal vessels with 
conventional gear 15-21 m’ and ‘coastal shrimp trawlers’ would be able to increase their shrimp 
catches over what we have seen in the last three years by capturing market shares from ocean trawling 
vessels with cold storage plant (which are part of the trawlers on vessel group 6). Later in the 
sensitivity analysis we introduce further restrictions for other vessel groups. 
 
Steinshamn (2005) also included a number of politically determined constraints on the distribution of 
fish catches among vessel groups; particularly coastal vessels versus ocean-going vessels. We do not 
include political constraints in our base case. The effect of political constraints is explored in the 
sensitivity analysis.   
7. Optimization Results 
Base case 
In the base case, we add by-catch constraints, limit the number of vessels to the actual number of 
vessels in 2011 for each vessel group, and exclude politically determined catch distribution constraints 
among coastal and ocean-going vessels.  Since the objective function is linear, the optimal solution 
will use the most profitable technology for each species up to the maximum capacity of that vessel 
group before employing another vessel group to harvest that particular species.  We find the maximum 
resource rent for the base case in 2011 for the ten economically most important species using the 
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CONOPT optimization procedure in GAMS11. The profit maximizing resource rent from the ten 
economically most important species was found to increase by a factor of 4.55 from 2011-NOK 1.453 
billion to 2011- NOK 6.614 billion.  Add to this the resource rent of the species not included in this 
optimization (but included in the 2011 Profitability Survey), we get a total resource rent of NOK-2011 
7.211 billion for commercial fishers and a resource rent of 2011-NOK 9.330 billion if the resource rent 
for these remaining species also could increase  by a factor of 4.55 through efficiency improvements. 
Using these numbers and a discount rate of four per cent, the Norwegian fish resource is worth an 
estimated 2011-NOK 233 billion or 2014-NOK 245 billion (adjusted using the consumer price index).  
 
We find that the optimal resource rent in 2011 is around 7 billion NOK more than the observed one. 
When decomposing the change in optimal resource rent compared to the actual rent into changes in 
total revenue and total costs, we find that total revenue falls by about 10 per cent, which means that 
the catches are actually redistributed to vessels that receive a lower price in the optimum.  
Simultaneously, total costs falls by around 80 per cent, this means that maximization of resource rent 
is almost synonymous with allocating the catch to the most cost-effective vessel groups. In 2010 and 
2012 the average fish prices were lower. However, if we adjust total revenue and total costs for the 
national accounts numbers in 2010 and 2012 correspondingly (see Figure 1), we find that the optimal 
resource rent is 6.9 and 7.4 billion current NOK higher than the one observed in 2010 and 2012, 
respectively. Even if this is a very simple adjustment, these numbers are not far from the loss of 7 
billion NOK in 2011. 
 
Steinshamn (2005) calibrated a similar model with 2002 data that included ten species and also added 
some institutional constraints (i.e. the TAC distribution between coastal and ocean-going vessels). 
Steinshamn (2005) found that the resource rent could be increased from literally zero to 2002-NOK 
7.365 billion that is 2011-NOK 9.2 billion12) with a five percent discount rate13.  Steinshamn’s and our 
resource rent estimates necessarily differ because of model calibration, different species included in 
the optimization model, different structuring of vessel groups, and because Steinshamn (2005) 
includes some additional institutional constrains. Our base case also includes a specific compensation 
to the owner of the vessel. In the base case, this compensation is set to the average mainland annual 
wages for non-resource sectors.  
 
                                                     
11 The GAMS code is available from the corresponding author upon request. 
12 Adjusted by the weighted average of the consumer price indices for public and private consumption. 
13 If running Steinshamns model with a four per cent discount rate the resource rent is 2002-NOK 7.921 billion. 
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Figure 4 shows the model results in terms of participating vessel groups and their catch (in 1000 tons). 
Since the marginal profit is positive for at least one vessel group for all species, the entire TAC is 
caught. The only exception is capelin fisheries, where the marginal income is negative for all vessel 
groups.14 We emphasize that some vessel groups over the years have had more possibilities for 
efficiency improvements within the prevailing regulations than others. These vessel groups will thus 
come out with relatively lower costs than those who have had less opportunity to choose the 
technology and capacity that best suits the fisheries they participate in. We would also strongly 
emphasize that the distribution of catch among vessel groups is sensitive to the definition of vessel 
groups by the Directorate of Fisheries and the time/catch parameter. In our results the groups with the 
biggest vessels are favored. It is possible that some of the groups with smaller vessels may have a 
time/catch parameter that lowers their cost sufficiently to include them in the model solution. In that 
case the fish catch would be redistributed to vessel groups with lower costs and, other things being 
equal, the optimal resource rent would increase.   
 
The most efficient vessel groups are coastal seine vessels < 11m’ (gr. 9) and ‘coastal seine vessels 
>21m’ (gr. 11). All existing vessels in these vessel groups are utilized in the solution. In addition, gr. 3 
‘coastal conventional vessels 15-21m’, gr. 4 ‘coastal conventional > 21 m’, gr. 6 ‘trawlers’, gr. 7 
‘coastal shrimp trawlers’, gr. 10 ‘coastal seine 11-21m’, gr. 12 ‘purse seines’ and gr. 13 ‘pelagic 
trawlers’ are used in the solution.  Vessel groups 1, 2, 5 and 8 are not fishing in the optimal solution 
given our calibration of the data.  These groups either receive too low prices for their fish or have too 
high costs.  
 
‘Coastal shrimp trawlers’ catch shrimp up to capacity (4,950 ton), ‘coastal conventional vessels 15-
21m’ catch 150 ton and ‘trawlers’ catch the remaining (4,950). ‘Pelagic trawlers’ catch all saithe up to 
capacity (176,031 ton). Haddock is caught by ‘coastal seine vessels < 11m’ (26,660 ton), ‘coastal 
seine vessels 11-21 m’ (14,918) and ‘coastal seine vessels > 21m’(107,584). ‘Coastal seine vessels > 
21m’ also catches all the cod ( 275,948 ton). ‘Coastal conventional > 21 m’ catches all the cusk 
(12,322 ton) and all the ling (14,431 ton). ‘Purse seines’ catches the whole herring quota (615,642 
ton), the whole mackerel quota (199,501 ton) and all the blue whiting (18,323 ton). The purse seines 
are responsible for most of the catch; as much as 833,436 ton.  
  
                                                     
14 Even if we double the length of the season and hence vessel capacity, which means a halving of the variable costs for all 
vessel groups, the capelin fisheries is still not profitable. The landed value of capelin was around 5 per cent of the total value 
of our ten species in 2011. 
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Figure 4.  Model results, in terms of catch in 1000 tons for each vessel group and species.  
  
Figure 5.  Optimal resource rent by vessel group and change in employees by vessel group.  
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of the optimal resource rent among vessel groups in the base case. As 
measured in 2011-NOK, ‘purse seines’ have the largest resource rent of  2.99 billion, ‘pelagic 
trawlers’ have a resource rent of 926 mill, and ‘trawlers’ earn a surplus of 147 mill. The resource rent 
among coastal vessel groups is distributed as follows: ‘coastal shrimp trawlers’: 167 mill.,‘coastal 
seine vessels < 11m’: 86 mill., ‘coastal seine vessels 11-21m’: 29 mill., ‘coastal seine vessels > 21m’: 
2.156 billion, ‘coastal conventional vessels 15-21m’: 5 mill., and ‘coastal conventional vessels >21 m’ 
106 mill. Employment in fisheries is reduced from 8389 positions to 1,806 positions. 
Optimal Resource Rent for the most Efficient Vessel Groups 
Our results show that the resource rent could be much higher than what it is under the current 
conditions and policy regime. What the optimal resource rent could be is a hypothetical concept. The 
optimal resource rent critically depends on the assumptions we make for the use of labor and capital. 
The base case finds the optimal resource rent when using the existing vessel fleet more efficiently. The 
structure and efficiency of the current vessel fleet reflect past decisions and policies. What could the 
optimal resource rent have been if we had a more optimal (modernized) fleet of vessels? Recognizing 
that a new vessel fleet will not appear overnight, Steinshamn (2005) strategy to answer this question 
was to keep the existing fleet of vessels making each vessel as efficient as the most efficient vessel in 
the respective vessel group. To perform the analysis Steinshamn (2005) used data on costs from the 
Directorate of Fisheries. Because these cost data are not publicly available we were unable to repeat 
Steinshamn’s analysis for 2011 in the available time frame for this study. Instead we calculate the 
optimal resource rent if one freely could add new vessels to the most efficient vessel groups (types). 
We find that the resource rent for the ten economically most important species increases by 2011-
NOK 108 mill to 2011-NOK 6.722 billion if one had unlimited access to vessels in the most efficient 
vessel groups. Hence it appears that building additional vessels of the most efficient types would only 
make a relatively modest contribution to increasing the resource rent. 
The cost of politically distributing quotas among coastal and ocean-going vessels.  
We also ran a case where we included politically determined constraints that divide the catch between 
coastal and ocean-going vessels.  That is certain coastal vessel groups were not allowed to harvest 
more pelagic fish (herring and mackerel) than they did in 2011 and where certain ocean-going vessel 
groups were not allowed to harvest more cod than they did in 2011. Adding these constraints reduced 
the resource rent by an estimated 2011-NOK 952 mill.  
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8. Sensitivity analysis 
Probably the most uncertain parameter in our analysis is the time/catch relationship for species i and 
vessel group j. Steinshamn (2005) based his fij-values on data from the 1996 activity analysis. 
Unfortunately, no new data on the time/catch relationship has been gathered since 1996. The accuracy 
of the fij-values is limited because they reflect the fish stocks, technology that was present in 1996. The 
accuracy of the former fij-values is further diminished by the fact that the official vessel groups in 1996 
had been consolidated by 2002, and that there were further consolidations by 2011. We attempted to 
generate new fij-values but concluded that too many inaccuracies arose.  Without further knowledge it 
is  difficult to say what would be a meaningful sensitivity analysis for the fij-values.  However, if we 
had the true fij-values, this would lead to reallocation of catch between vessel groups. 
 
Another question for sensitivity analysis is how the optimal resource rent changes with other 
alternative wage rates of the fishers and the owners. In the base case we applied the average mainland 
wage rate for the non-natural resource industries for both fishers and owners, and it may be questioned 
whether this alternative wage rate is reasonable. The educational level is relatively low in the fishery 
sector, meaning that the base case may apply a too high alternative wage rate. Applying the annual 
average wage rate for the primary sectors15 leads to a resource rent of NOK 7.282, a ten per cent 
increase from the base case. Following Steinshamn (2005), we set the alternative wage rate for the 
owners to zero. However, this only increases the resource rent with 2.5 per cent compared to the base 
case. The reason is that the number of owners compared to the number of fishers is relatively low in 
the vessel groups that have the highest profitability. 
 
Further, we perform a sensitivity analysis on prices (+ / -) 20 per cent.  Actually this price increase and 
decrease lead to a 36 per cent increase and a 37 per cent reduction in the resource rent, respectively. 
The reason is that the price changes alter the combined resource rent for ‘purse seines’ and ‘pelagic 
trawlers’ with as much as 80 per cent, and these groups constituted the lionʼs share of resource rent in 
the base case. 
 
It may be unreasonable to assume that ‘pelagic trawlers’ can catch all saithe up to capacity (176,031 
ton), as saithe is a groundfish. Hence, we run a sensitivity analysis where the pelagic trawlers were 
allowed to catch only half of the quota. This reduces the resource rent by only 3 per cent. The reason is 
that the other half of the quota now is caught primarily by ‘purse seines’ and to some extent ‘coastal 
                                                     
15 Applying the national accounts, the yearly wage rate in the primary sectors in 2011 was NOK 453,000 compared to a 
mainland wage rate of NOK 619,000. The latter was only one per cent lower than the average wage rate in the fishery sector.  
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seine vessels >21m’, both groups being relatively cost-effective in the saithe fisheries, preventing a 
larger reduction in the resource rent. 
 
We also study the effect on the results of the by-catch constraints between cod and haddock. Omitting 
the by-catch constrains has negligible effects on the results; the constraint is only binding for  
vessel gr. 4 ‘coastal conventional > 21 m’ (see Table A6 in the appendix). The resource rent only 
increases with NOK 1 million, with a decline in the resource rent of vessel gr. 9 ‘coastal seine vessels 
>21m’ of NOK 29 million, which is now not participating in the fisheries, and a corresponding 
increase in the resource rent of vessel gr. 4 ‘coastal conventional > 21 m’ of NOK 30 million. 
 
We also explore the effect of simply using the actual number of days in operation for each vessel 
group and not the potential number of days in estimating the resource rent. In other words, the fishing 
season for each vessel group is not increased and this means that vessels have constant capacity. We 
still take seasonal catch-limits into consideration if they are binding (see Table A7 in the appendix). 
The result is a reduction in the resource rent of 11 per cent from the base case.16 The main explanation 
for this is a reduction in the value of the cod fisheries in ‘coastal seine vessels >21m’ (gr. 11) of 
almost NOK 700 million, although ‘other trawlers’ (gr. 8) increases its cod fishery somewhat.  
However, as ‘coastal seine vessels >21m’ is a group of large vessels, this result does not seem 
reasonable.  Generally, larger vessels can exploit the fish stocks a larger part of the year than smaller 
vessels, i.e. they can increase their fishing season and capacity. However, all in all, the latter two 
sensitivity analysis show that the by-catch constraints and the assumption of increased seasonal length 
in the base case, is not important for our result; the resource rent can at least be increased by a factor 
of four from the present resource rent in 2011. The interest rate has been set to four per cent in all 
previous resource rent calculations at Statistics Norway, thus we will not run any sensitivity analysis 
on this parameter value.  
9. Discussion of Results 
The actual resource rent has generally been on an increasing trend from 1984 to 2014.  Norwegian 
fisheries have in some of the later years had positive resource rent.  However, in 2012-2014 the 
present resource rent were again negative. Factors contributing to the increasing resource rent over 
time are: 
                                                     
16 Even with the present seasonal length (as well as with the present vessel and gear types) this means that resource rent 
increases from NOK 1.453 billion in the base case to 5.874 billion, an increase by a factor of 4. 
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 A year by year reduction in the number of hrs. worked in the sector reducing total 
compensation to employees 
 A reduction in the number of vessels thus reducing fixed costs and capital consumption, 
although the gross tonnage has remain fairly constant 
 
Thus the actual resource rent in Norwegian fisheries has in large part been increased by reducing 
harvesting costs through fleet consolidation, which has led to less employment and lowered capital 
costs. Furthermore,  the optimization results suggest that the resource rent in Norwegian fisheries 
could be greater than today. In principle, the resource rent could be increased through further 
reduction in the number of vessels and employment, by increasing the season length and by 
redistributing the catch to the vessels that receive the highest prices and have the lowest costs. Our 
results show that the single most important change in our optimization is allocating the catch to the 
most cost-effective vessel groups. We indicate that the resource rent could be increased by a factor of 
4.5 from today’s level. For the ten economically most important species the resource rent in 2011 
could be, according to our results, increased from about 1.5 billion NOK to about 6.6 billion NOK.  
This order of magnitude increase in the resource rent of Norwegian fisheries is consistent with the 
results of previous studies. The optimal redistribution of catch among vessels depends on the 
calibration of the optimization model. The variable costs of each vessel group may be affected by 
time/catch relationships, for which we have no usable data. The last data on time/catch relationships 
were collected in a survey of fishers in 1996, when stock-levels and technology were quite different 
from today.  Thus, while the resource rent could be increased considerably, we need better data on 
time/catch relationships to infer which vessel groups are the most efficient. With our calibration of the 
model, vessel groups that catch pelagic fish such as herring and mackerel are quite profitable, while 
coastal vessel groups appear less profitable, except for ‘coastal seine vessels > 21m’ which rank as the 
second most important vessel group after ‘purse seines’. Finally, resource rents could hypothetically 
be even greater if TACs were set at the bioeconomic optimal level.  TACs may be interpreted as 
maximum sustained yield (MSY).  With improved technology for finding the fish and reduced search 
costs, MSY and bioeconomic optimal catch levels may not be all that different.   
10. Conclusions and Further Work 
We find that the actual resource rent of Norwegian fisheries has increased through fleet consolidation 
resulting in fewer employed and less capital costs. We also find that there is further potential for 
increasing the resource rent through further fleet consolidation, less employment, by allowing the most 
profitable vessels catch more and by extending the catch season. As the present resource rent can be 
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increased by applying fewer fishers and fewer vessels, we are per definition in a situation of resource 
waste in the fishery sector as well as less value creation elsewhere as both human and fixed capital 
have an alternative value in other sectors. Furthermore, our results show that the dominating structural 
change needed is allocating the catch of the various species to the most cost-efficient vessels. We 
emphasize that some vessel groups over the years have had more possibilities for efficiency 
improvements within the prevailing regulations than others. These vessel groups will thus come out 
with relatively lower costs than those who have had less opportunity to choose the technology and 
capacity that best suits the fisheries they participate in. For our model calibration, we found that that 
the maximized resource rent in 2011 for the 10 most profitable species was about 6.6 billion NOK. If 
the same increase in the resource rent could be realized for all other species, the resource rent in 2011 
for Norwegian fisheries could have been NOK 9.3 billion. Assuming that TACs were bioeconomically 
optimal, and for the prices and technology in 2011 this means that the Norwegian fish resource is 
worth NOK 230 billion.  
 
Our sensitivity analyses show that it is highly probable that the optimal resource rent could increase 
further if we had applied lower alternative wages than in the base case, to better reflect the fishers and 
owners true alternative value. In addition, we show that our results of a potentially high optimal 
resource rent are neither dependent on assumptions of by-catch constraints nor on the extension of the 
actual fishing season nor capacity in 2011 for the various vessel groups. However, the resource rent is 
of course highly dependent on the prices, especially on those species caught by the most efficient 
vessel groups. We find that the optimal resource rent in 2011 is around 7 billion NOK more than the 
observed one. When decomposing the change in optimal resource rent compared to the actual rent into 
changes in total revenue and total costs, we find that total revenue falls by about 10 per cent.  
Simultaneously, total costs falls by around 80 per cent. In 2010 and 2012 the average fish prices were 
lower. However, if we adjust total revenue and total costs for the national accounts numbers in 2010 
and 2012 correspondingly, we find that the optimal resource rent is 6.9 and 7.4 billion higher than the 
one observed in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Even if this is a very simple adjustment, these numbers 
are not far from the loss of 7 billion NOK in 2011. 
 
The goal of this paper is not to suggest policy recommendations, but to make visible the cost of the 
present management system in the Norwegian fisheries. The Marine Resources Act emphasizes both 
settlement in coastal communities and efficient management of the resource. Some have argued that 
the ongoing rent dissipation only is a way to redistribute income in the fishery sector. However, as the 
resource rent can be increased by applying fewer fishers and fewer vessels, we are per definition in a 
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situation with resource waste in the fishery sector as well as lower value creation in other sectors, as 
both the fishers and vessels have an alternative value in other industries. However, only in the 
unrealistic situation where the fishers and vessels that are removed from the fisheries in the optimal 
situation have zero alterative value in other sectors, the present management system could be 
described only as a way of financing employment in the fisheries through rent dissipation without 
leading to lower value creation in other industries as well. 
 
The Marine Resources Act states that fish resources belong to Norway as a whole.  The profitability of 
Norwegian fisheries has improved but is unequally distributed among vessel groups. The structural 
quota system has caused a consolidation in the fishing industry. In conjunction with the structural 
quota system the introduction of a tax on the resource rent was discussed in a government white paper 
(St.meld. 21, 2006). If such a tax is to be introduced much more would have to be known about the 
distribution of the resource rent in fisheries among vessel groups and owners. 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Catch of each species by vessel group (tons) 
Vessel group Cod Capelin Herring Blue whiting Haddock Saithe
1 28878 0 0 0 6552 5331
2 35861 0 5120 0 10916 10701
3 34667 0 7125 0 15209 7598
4 17996 4142 17303 0 12546 8355
5 29948 0 0 0 27671 9549
6 103617 0 0 0 72496 67629
7 878 0 1769 0 0 3247
8 794 0 0 0 492 15188
9 630 0 5366 0 29 514
10 9483 8120 64298 0 1217 10942
11 12812 20117 118759 0 2034 34091
12 384 282731 338798 11119 0 1788
13 0 29518 57104 7204 0 1098
Vessel group Cusk Mackerel Ling Shrimp
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 3262 2174 0
3 1199 0 1233 150
4 812 0 1523 0
5 10311 0 8760 0
6 0 0 483 18870
7 0 535 0 4112
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 2428 0 0
10 0 10693 258 0
11 0 23722 0 0
12 0 145909 0 0
13 0 12952 0 0
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Table A2 Average price of each species by vessel group 2011-NOK per kg 
Vessel group Cod Capelin Herring Blue whiting Haddock Saithe
1 10.49 0 0 0 7.47 7.1
2 10.85 0 3.25 0 7.03 7.22
3 11.22 0 4.39 0 6.66 7.52
4 11.85 1.64 4.21 0 6.76 7.57
5 14.74 0 0 0 11.15 10.38
6 12.29 0 0 0 8.51 9.55
7 13.27 0 4.25 0 0 9.65
8 14.5 0 0 0 9.11 8.69
9 10.47 0 3.82 0 6.2 5.59
10 10.51 1.57 4.2 0 4.79 4.8
11 10.61 1.95 4.76 0 5.07 4.91
12 8.55 2.21 5.84 4.08 0 4.67
13 0 2.14 5.23 2.27 0 7.13
 
Vessel group Cusk Mackerel Ling Shrimp
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 8.95 7.6 0
3 7.77 0 9.78 38.15
4 6.99 0 10.22 0
5 8.86 0 13.49 0
6 0 0 9.73 16.7
7 0 9.64 0 51.78
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 9.33 0 0
10 0 10.39 6.61 0
11 0 12.09 0 0
12 0 12.98 0 0
13 0 10.57 0 0
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Table A3. Capacity per vessel by vessel group 
Vessel 
group 
Number of 
vessels, all 
Total catch 
per year in 
tons 
Present capaci-
ty per year per 
vessel in tons
Days in 
operation 
per year
Potential 
number of 
days in opera-
tion 
Potential ca-
pacity per year 
per vessel in 
tons
1 611 40761 67 173 330 127
2 293 65860 225 197 330 377
3 121 64749 535 200 330 883
4 37 56200 1519 207 330 2421
5 35 67168 1919 332 330 1908
6 39 262612 6734 305 330 7286
7 80 10541 132 214 330 203
8 4 16474 4119 300 330 4530
9 43 8967 209 111 330 620
10 93 96633 1039 182 330 1884
11 62 191418 3087 182 330 5598
12 80 486879 6086 173 330 11609
13 27 71154 2635 192 330 4529
 
Table A4. Variable costs (not adjusting for seasonal length) per kg 
Vessel 
group VCj 
1 18.16 
2 11.03 
3 8.67 
4 6.35 
5 10.44 
6 7.93 
7 25.08 
8 7.08 
9 8.32 
10 4.61 
11 3.91 
12 3.23 
13 2.36 
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Table A5. Insurance, fixed capital value and depreciation 2011-NOK 
Vessel 
group Insurance Fixed capital value Depreciation
1 24472 793740 67218
2 69796 1993793 175133
3 114469 4976681 378198
4 289408 17787350 1141719
5 467612 39170840 2308457
6 562586 64736886 5871420
7 75728 2301731 192430
8 328193 27377328 2817484
9 13980 774542 57965
10 142344 4127990 336927
11 348571 28331910 1595951
12 609190 66140942 4219244
13 323451 28136452 1994364
 
Table A6. By-catch of haddock per unit catch of cod in 2011 
Vessel group Lower limit (per cent) Upper limit (per cent)
1 20 30
2 15 40
3 20 50
4 15 80
5 60 100
6 60 90
 
Table A7. Catch constraints  
Vessel group Catch constraint 
 Cod Herring Mackerel Capelin Blue whiting
1         2/317  
2                   2/3 1/2  
3 2/3 1/2  
4 2/3 1/2 1/3 
5 2/3  
6 2/3  
7   
8 2/3  
9 2/3 1/2 3/7  
10 2/3 1/2 3/7 1/3 
11 2/3 1/2 3/7 1/3 
12 2/3 1/2 3/7 1/3 2/3
13  1/2 3/7 1/3 2/3
 
                                                     
17 The season for cod is 330 days  x 2/3 = 220 days. The potential capacity for vessel group 1 is 184 ton per vessel. This 
means that the adjusted potential capacity in the cod fisheries is scaled down with 2/3, i.e. 122.7 tons per vessel.    
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Table A8. Adjusted potential variable costs per kg18 
Vessel group Cod Capelin Herring Blue whiting Haddock Saithe
1 14.28 25 25 25 9.52 9.52
2 9.89 25 13.18 25 6.59 6.59
3 7.89 25 10.52 25 5.26 5.26
4 6.14 11.94 7.96 25 3.98 3.98
5 16.02 25 25 25 10.68 10.68
6 11.10 25 25 25 7.33 7.33
7 16.58 25 16.26 25 16.26 16.26
8 9.66 25 25 25 6.44 6.44
9 4.20 25 5.6 25 2.8 2.8
10 3.81 7.62 5.08 25 2.54 2.54
11 3.24 6.48 4.32 25 2.16 2.16
12 2.55 5.10 3.40 2.55 1.70 1.70
13 25 4.11 2.74 2.06 25 1.37
 
Vessel group Cusk Mackerel Ling Shrimp
1 25 25 25 25
2 25 6.59 6.59 25
3 5.26 25 5.26 5.26
4 3.98 25 3.98 25
5 10.68 25 10.68 25
6 25 25 7.33 7.33
7 25 16.58 25 16.26
8 25 25 25 25
9 25 6.53 25 25
10 25 5.93 2.54 25
11 25 5.04 25 25
12 25 3.97 25 25
13 25 3.20 25 25
 
                                                     
18 Costs are set to 25 to prevent a vessel group from harvesting that particular species. 
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